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We present  a dynamic  model  of international  lending  in which bor- 
rowers  cannot  commit  to  future  repayments  and  in which  debtors 
can sometimes  successfully  negotiate  partial defaults  or "reschedul- 
ing  agreements."  All  parties  in  a  debt  rescheduling  negotiation 
realize  that  today's  rescheduling  agreement  may  itself  have  to  be 
renegotiated  in  the  future.  Our  bargaining-theoretic  approach  al- 
lows us to handle  the effects  of  uncertainty  on  sovereign  debt  con- 
tracts in a much  more  satisfactory way than in earlier analyses. The 
framework  is readily extended  to analyze the conflicting  interests of 
different  lenders  and of  banks and creditor  country  taxpayers. 
I.  Introduction 
Over  the  past  6  years,  a  large  number  of  less  developed  countries 
(LDCs)  have  repeatedly  "rescheduled"  their  payments  on  loans  to 
Western  banks.'  Bank  loans  to  many  countries  trade  at  sizable  dis- 
We gratefully  acknowledge  the support  of  the Alfred  P. Sloan  Foundation  and  the 
National Science  Foundation.  Much of this work was done  while Bulow was visiting the 
University of Chicago  Business  School and Rogoff  was a National  Fellow at the Hoover 
Institution. 
' In  1983,  18 countries  rescheduled  the payments  on $61 billion of debt. In 1984,  19 
countries  rescheduled  $136  billion, and  in  1985,  14 countries  rescheduled  $51  billion. 
From 1980 to 1982, there  were an average of six reschedulings  per year (see Watson et 
al.  1986, tables 36,  37,  38). 
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counts,2 and banks have had to take large write-downs  on their LDC 
assets. Still, LDC loans are hardly worthless.  Many of the largest debt- 
ors have made  significant  repayments  since  1982, and LDC loans still 
have  an  aggregate  market  value  of  hundreds  of  billions  of  dollars. 
This  paper  investigates  the  bargaining  process  that  governs  "re- 
scheduling  agreements,"  or negotiated  partial defaults,  on LDC debt.3 
Sovereign  lending  is distinguished  from  domestic  lending  in three 
ways. First, "ability" to pay is never  truly an issue. Aside  from  Chile, 
none of the major Latin debtors owe as much as a year's gross national 
product,4  an amount  that could  clearly be repaid over the long  hori- 
zon were  there  the  political  will to do  so. Second,  collateral  is irrele- 
vant. Debtor assets that would be accessible to creditors in the event of 
outright  repudiation  are worth  only  a small fraction  of  outstanding 
debt. Third,  the bargaining  between  debtors and creditors is ongoing, 
with contracts constantly subject to renegotiation.  By contrast, domes- 
tic bankruptcy  negotiations  have  more  of  a one-time  flavor. 
This  constant  renegotiation  feature  complicates  the analysis of sov- 
ereign  loans.  In  rescheduling  negotiations,  the  parties  bargain  over 
both a current  payment  and a schedule  of future repayments.  But the 
present  value  of  future  repayments  depends  on  the  likelihood  and 
probable outcome  of future  rescheduling  negotiations.  While solving 
this problem  in its most general  form would be extremely  difficult, we 
are  able  to  solve  the  case  in  which  borrowers  and  lenders  are  risk 
neutral.  This  analysis  yields  insights  that  should  carry  over  to  the 
more  general  case. 
Compared  with earlier  models  of sovereign  lending,5  our bargain- 
ing-theoretic  model  produces  different  and  more  realistic  predic- 
tions.  Earlier  work  has  argued  that  when  contracts  cannot  be  fully 
indexed,  costly  penalties  will be invoked  whenever  countries  do  not 
pay.  However,  these  analyses  have  not  allowed  for the  possibility of 
renegotiation.  When renegotiation  is feasible, inefficient  penalties are 
never invoked  because a deal can always be made to share the benefits 
of  forbearance.  The  penalties  that  lenders  can  impose  on  debtors 
(which  we  discuss  in  some  detail  in  Sec.  II  and  the  Appendix)  are 
relevant only in determining  the threat points  for renegotiation.  But 
the possibility of renegotiation,  combined  with the inability of debtors 
2  As of July  27,  1987,  Salomon  Brothers  listed  the  following  bid prices  for  foreign 
debt (cents per dollar of direct government  loans): Argentina,  47; Brazil, 55; Chile, 67; 
Colombia,  81;  Mexico,  53;  Peru,  11;  Philippines,  67;  Poland,  43;  Turkey,  97;  and 
Venezuela,  67.  Ask prices were  1-5  cents  above  bid prices. 
3 For  an  overview  of  the  earlier  literature  on  sovereign  lending  and  default,  see 
Eaton, Gersovitz, and  Stiglitz (1986)  and  Eaton and Taylor  (1986). 
iBased  on  the  1985-86  and  the  1986-87  World  Bank debt tables. 
The  seminal  paper  is Eaton and  Gersovitz  (1981). SOVEREIGN  DEBT  157 
to  credibly  promise  not  to  renegotiate,  leads  to  a different  class of 
inefficiencies. 
The  analysis also brings  into  sharp  relief  the  differences  between 
the average  market value of existing  debt and the marginal value, to 
creditors  as a whole,  of  new debt.  When  the market value of a coun- 
try's debt  lies far below  its face  value,  marginal  increases  in the  face 
value of the debt have little effect  on its aggregate  market value. The 
near  worthlessness  of  marginal  debt  explains  why all parties  are  so 
concerned  with the  net  level  of  today's repayments.  By the same to- 
ken,  today's  "problem"  debtors  would  probably  benefit  very  little 
from  widely  discussed  schemes  to  forgive  10 or 20  percent  of  their 
debts,  or  from  debt-for-equity  swaps  (see  Bulow  and  Rogoff  1988). 
Marginal decreases  in the debt's face value have only a second-order 
impact on eventual  repayments. 
II.  Incentives  for  Repayment 
Aside from a sense of moral obligation,  there are three reasons why a 
country makes repayments  on its foreign  debt and, thus, why lenders 
provide  funds.  First, as in domestic  lending,  lenders  may be able to 
appropriate  collateral.6 Second,  repayment  may hold  the carrot of a 
good  reputation  for the borrower,  implying  improved  ability to bor- 
row in the future.  Third,  lenders  may hold the stick of being  able to 
impose  sanctions  that will impede  trade and financial market transac- 
tions. However,  military invasions to enforce  debt claims are presum- 
ably a thing  of  the  past,7 and  the  vulnerable  assets  held  abroad  by 
most  LDCs are  trivial relative  to  the  amounts  they  owe.'  Assuming 
that collateral is insignificant,  we are really left with two explanations 
for repayments,  each  probably  with some  validity. 
The  reputational  approach  is  discussed  in  Eaton  and  Gersovitz 
(1981)  and  has  been  adopted  by Grossman  and  Van  Huyck  (1987) 
and others.  In its pure  form,  the reputational  approach  assumes  that 
all legal  sanctions  are  irrelevant.  A  debtor's  sole  incentive  to  make 
repayments  is  to  preserve  its  reputation  as  a  good  borrower.  The 
6  Such power  has enabled  the creditors  who provide  aircraft financing  to stay aloof 
from any debt  renegotiations  (see Stuber  1985). 
7  The  United  States did  intervene  in debt  crises  in Venezuela,  the  Dominican  Re- 
public, Haiti, Honduras,  and Nicaragua between  1902 and  1930 before abandoning  the 
Roosevelt  Corollary.  (Under  the  Roosevelt  Corollary,  the  United  States barred  Euro- 
pean military intervention  to collect debts in South America but undertook  responsibil- 
ity for enforcing  creditors'  claims.) The  best-known  nineteenth-century  military inter- 
ventions  occurred  in  Egypt  and  Turkey,  by  England  and  France,  respectively.  For 
details see Winkler (1933),  Borchard  and  Wynne  (1951),  and  Dammers  (1984). 
8  The  one  substantial  seizure  of' assets  in  recent  years  was  the  1979  freezing  of' 
Iranian assets (see,  e.g.,  Field and  Adam  1980). 158  JOURNAL  OF  POLITICAL  ECONOMY 
debtor believes  that if it loses its reputation,  it will lose its ability to go 
to the world capital markets for income  insurance  contracts and con- 
sumption-smoothing  loans.9 However,  for the reputational  approach 
to be valid, one  must assume  that no one  will sell financial assets such 
as stocks, bonds,  and  insurance  contracts  to a debtor  in default.'0  If 
creditors  have  no  legal  rights  at  all,  it  is  hard  to  understand  why 
creditor  country  institutions,  other  than  perhaps  the  angry  banks 
holding  the bad debts, should  ever be unwilling  to provide  insurance 
to an LDC that will pay cash up front.  If the LDC can buy insurance, 
then any reputational  "equilibrium" involving  a positive level of debt 
will  unravel.  The  debtor  will  repudiate  and  use  some  of  the  cash 
earmarked  for  debt  repayments  to  purchase  insurance  contracts.-" 
The  empirical  case  for  the  pure  reputation  approach  is also  weak. 
Eichengreen  (1987)12  and  Lindert  and  Morton  (1987)13  both  show 
that, historically,  past repayment  records  have had little bearing  on a 
country's ability to borrow. 
We believe  that the primary motivation  for repayment  is the threat 
of direct sanctions  that lenders  can impose  by going  to creditor coun- 
try courts  and  by influencing  their  domestic  legislators.  Such  sanc- 
tions  can  cost  defaulting  debtor  countries  their  ability  to  transact 
freely  in the  financial  and  goods  markets.  For example,  if a country 
repudiates  its foreign  loans,  it will be  forced  to conduct  its trade  in 
roundabout  ways to  avoid  seizure.  To  compound  this problem,  the 
country  will also  be  blocked  from  normal  access  to  trade  credits.'4 
9 We  mean  to  include  loans  "for  investment"  that  enable  the  country  to  smooth 
consumption  while  still taking advantage  of' profitable  domestic  investment  projects. 
1)  It is possible  that the  country  might  not  be able to purchase  insurance  contracts 
because,  say, it is difficult  to legally verify its output  (see Sec. V below). Still, as long as 
the country  can construct  a portfolio  of  foreign  assets that is highly correlated  with its 
output,  the  role  for reputation  is limited. 
1  Bulow  and  Rogoff  (1989)  show that no debt contract can be a sequential  equilib- 
rium  if' the  only  adverse  consequence  of  a  default  is the  loss  of' a  "reputation  for 
repayment."  That  is, for any such contingent  debt  contract  there  will always be some 
node on the "game tree" where the country  will be better off defaulting  on its debt and 
conducting  all its future  business on a cash-in-advance  basis. Furthermore,  even if some 
lending  is feasible because of' direct sanctions,  having a reputation  for repayment  in no 
way enhances  a small LDC's ability to borrow. 
12  "In the  raw data,  no  relationship  between  default  in  the  1930's and  borrowing 
after  1945 is apparent.  But reputational  factors are only a subset of the factors affecting 
a government's  willingness  and  ability to  borrow  abroad.  The  United  Nations,  when 
discussing external  borrowing  in this period,  cited country size and relative importance 
of  imports  in domestic  consumption  as factors  positively  associated  with borrowing" 
(Eichengreen  1987,  p. 39). 
13  "Investors seem to pay little attention  to the past repayment  record of the borrow- 
ing  government"  (Lindert  and  Morton  1987,  p.  3).  Eichengreen's  study  covers  the 
period  1920-55,  and Lindert and  Morton examine  the record  from the middle  of the 
nineteenth  century  until the  1980s. 
14 Bolivia and Peru were the first to try confrontational  approaches  with their foreign 
creditors; both countries  suffered  a severe  reduction  in their access to short-term  trade 
credits  (see Cline  1987,  p. 4). SOVEREIGN  DEBT  159 
Very short term trade credits, such as bankers' acceptances and letters 
of credit, are enormously  important  in reducing  transactions costs in 
international  trade.  International  banks  can  exploit  economies  of 
scale in monitoring  costs to facilitate transactions  between  importers 
and exporters  who sometimes  know very little about one  another.  In 
the model  we develop,  a country  is willing to make some repayments 
on its debts in order  to enjoy its full gains from trade. Legal sanctions 
can also make  consumption  smoothing  more  difficult  by preventing 
LDCs from  openly  holding  assets in the  industrialized  countries  for 
fear of' seizure,  and this cost is consistent  with the spirit of' our paper. 
However,  our  model  is  much  easier  to  solve  when  agents  are  risk 
neutral  (and  so uninterested  in consumption  smoothing);  we there- 
fore ignore  the costs of lost access to the capital markets in our techni- 
cal analysis. 
Trade  sanctions  may be small for  most  countries  relative to GNP. 
However,  they  are  probably  of' sufficient  order  of  magnitude  to ex- 
plain observed  levels of-  debt repayments.  For many developing  coun- 
tries,  reschedulings  were  initiated  when  debts  equaled  only  a  few 
months'  GNP.  Because  the  real  interest  on  such  debts  is relatively 
small, Enders  and  Mattione  (1984,  p. 4) argue  that "even if one  as- 
sumes  that the  costs do  not  exceed  five percent  of  trade,  only  a few 
countries would gain" (from repudiation).  Peruvian officials have esti- 
mated  the  cost  to their  country  of  circumventing  trade  sanctions  in 
the  wake of' a total default  to  lie  between  10 and  15 percent  of  the 
value of trade. l 'As  the recent  Brazilian experience  confirms,  larger, 
more  complex  economies  such  as  Argentina,  Brazil,  and  Mexico 
would not necessarily find things easier. Of course, since both lenders 
and borrowers can be made much better off if a negotiated  settlement 
is reached,  sanctions  are generally  averted.  So there  are few cases in 
which countries actually have been forced to move trade underground. 
In the Appendix,  we discuss some of the legal remedies  available to 
creditors  and  some  evidence  on  the  efficacy  of  trade  sanctions  (see 
also Kaletsky 1985; Alexander  1987). Finally, through  their domestic 
political influence,  bank creditors  may be able to gain the assistance of 
their legislators  in imposing  trade penalties.  These  political sanctions 
are analytically indistinguishable  from legal sanctions in Sections  III- 
V but can be examined  separately  in the  more  disaggregated  model 
referred  to in Section  VI. 
III.  The  Model 
We  model  a  small  country  that  cannot  affect  the  world  prices  of 
traded goods  or world interest  rates. In the next  two sections  we will 
15'The  Andean Report (March  1986,  p.  27),  cited  in Alexander  (1987).  For evidence 
on the recent  Brazilian  moratorium,  see  n. 42. i6o  JOURNAL  OF  POLITICAL  ECONOMY 
consider the nonstochastic  case, and in Section V we introduce  uncer- 
tainty. 
The Country's  Objective  Function 
The  country  is governed  by leaders  who  seek  to  maximize  the  ex- 
pected  utility function 
ECD  +Cl 
lt,  =  El  ~+,+c+h  1 
i  (1  + 6h) 
where  CD  and  CF  are domestic  consumption  of  good  D and  good  F, 
respectively,  8 is the country's  (leaders') rate of time  preference,  h is 
the time interval between  periods,  and E, is the expectations  operator, 
based  on  time  t information.  The  country's  leaders'  preferences  do 
not necessarily  coincide  with those  of  its citizens,  though  henceforth 
we will not make any distinction. 
Technology  and Trading Opportunities 
Production  is exogenous.  Each period,  the country  produces  yIh  units 
of good  D. This  output  can be either  consumed  domestically,  stored, 
or traded  abroad in exchange  for P units of good F. There  are gains 
from  trade  because  P  >  1. If  S, denotes  the  amount  of  good  D the 
country  has in storage  entering  period  t, S,  0, then 
St+h  =  (1  -  Yh)S,  +  yh -  -  T.,  Vt,  (2) 
where  yh is the  deterioration  rate,  and  T, denotes  the  country's  ex- 
ports in period  t. 
As noted  above,  the country  will experience  difficulties  in trading 
abroad  if  it ever  unilaterally  repudiates  its debt.  Specifically,  we as- 
sume that a debtor  country's  net revenue  per unit of exports  is 1003 
percent lower whenever  it is in default  (O  '  1 '  1). Let X be a dummy 
variable that is zero whenever  the country  is current  on its debt obli- 
gations and equal to one  whenever  it falls into arrears without reach- 
ing a rescheduling  agreement.  Then 
t  =  TtP(  1  -  13Xt)  -  Rt,  (3) 
where R denotes  net repayments  to foreign  creditors in units of good 
F; R can be negative. 
Banks' Objective  Function 
The  country  can  borrow  abroad  from  competitive  risk-neutral 
lenders  ("banks"). The  world  interest  rate  is rh, which  for  now  we SOVEREIGN  DEBT  i6i 
will assume is nonstochastic  and constant.  Banks will lend to a country 
as long  as the  present  value  of  repayments  plus  seizures  yields  the 
market  rate of  return.  In  the  event  the  country  repudiates  its debt 
without signing  a rescheduling  agreement,  bank creditors are able to 
seize" a portion  of exports  for a net benefit of  100o  percent of gross 
exports,  0 <  a  ?  P.' 
` The  difference  between  the country's losses in 
default,  3PPt, and the banks' returns,  otPTt, represents  the resources 
expended  on  averting  and  enforcing  the banks' seizure  claims. 
Rational  lenders  will,  of  course,  require  some  type  of  seniority 
clause to be written  into  the contracts.  Here  we will assume  that the 
contracts have "negative seniority" clauses, which state that no future 
lender  may be senior.  In Section  IV, we will confirm  that a negative 
seniority clause is indeed  sufficient  to prevent  the country  from join- 
ing forces with new lenders  to game  existing  ones.  Obviously a strict 
seniority  clause  would  also  be  sufficient,  but  we  want  to  emphasize 
that in our analysis it is not necessary.  In practice, most lending  con- 
tracts between  private  banks  and  LDC  debtors  provide  the  lender 
only with a negative  seniority  clause.'7 
We will assume  that in any given period,  the country borrows from 
one of a large number  of competitive  lending  consortiums.  Through 
cross-default  clauses, banks within a consortium  are later able to bar- 
gain  with  the  country  over  repayments  as a single  unified  entity.'8 
Because  the  country  is  risk  neutral,  it  is  reasonable  to  conjecture 
temporarily  that in equilibrium  the country  will do all its borrowing  in 
the initial period.  Competition  among  consortiums  then ensures  that 
E() 
E  R,,,  +  othX,,  =  _0  (4) 
1.=  (1I +  rh)' 
Note  that the initial lending  consortium  will never gain any ex post 
monopoly  power  over  the  country  as long  as the  country  is always 
allowed  to repay  its outstanding  loans  by replacing  them  with loans 
from a new consortium. 
`6 The  creditors' profit from seizure activities can be the result of a negotiated  settle- 
ment  in the  subgame  in which  the country  tries to trade while  in arrears on  its debt. 
That  banks might  incur  legal  expenses  would  not  deter  them  from  going  to court  if 
they know they  have enough  bargaining  power  to force a negotiated  settlement.  The 
nuisance value to the country  of having its goods  and trading accounts tied up in legal 
action may be quite  high. 
17  For a discussion  of  negative  seniority clauses  (the legal term is parn passu or equal 
sharing) in international  loan contracts, see Gurria-Trevino  (1983),  Nurick (1983),  and 
Soliven  (1983). 
18  In an earlier version ofthis  paper (Bulow and Rogoff  1986), we extend  the results 
here to the case of several conflicting  lenders.  For a discussion  of some of the practical 
issues involved,  see  Lipson  (1981)  and  Brau and Williams (1983). 162  JOURNAL  OF  POLITICAL  ECONOMY 
IV.  The  Equilibrium  Loan Contract 
The  country's  motivation  for  borrowing  is that its discount  rate ex- 
ceeds the world interest rate, that is, 8 >  r.19 Given this assumption,  it 
is obvious that if the risk-neutral country could commit to any feasible 
future  repayment  stream, it would immediately  borrow and consume 
Py/r units of  good  F. This  amounts  to the entire  present  discounted 
value of its future  income  (in the limit as h --  0). Future generations 
would  be  left  to serve  as slaves  to  foreign  lenders.20  Of  course,  the 
country  cannot  make  such a commitment,  so rational lenders  would 
never let it borrow more than it can later be forced  to repay. Foreign 
lenders  know that their only leverage  over the country is the threat to 
harass its trade. Since the country always has the option of consuming 
its output  domestically,  it can never  be forced  to make repayments  in 
excess of its gains from trade. Moreover,  if 1 <  (P -  1)/P, the country 
can do better still by trading  and letting  the creditors  seize part of its 
shipments.  Thus  the country's  credit  limit certainly cannot  exceed 
k '  mn  (,  P  I )  (5) 
In previous  analyses of international  lending  and default  (see, e.g., 
Eaton and  Gersovitz  1981;  Sachs  1984; Cohen  and Sachs  1986),  it is 
typically assumed  that a country's credit limit is given by the penalty it 
would suffer  if it were to repudiate  its debts totally and finally. In the 
present  model,  this penalty  is given by expression  (5) above.  But this 
credit  limit may be  much  too  high  since  it does  take into  account  a 
country's ability to bargain with its creditors. 
If bargaining  were  limited  to the  banks  making  take-it-or-leave-it 
offers,  then  banks  could  indeed  extract  repayments  up  to  the  full 
amount  of a country's costs of seizure.  This  is easily shown to be true 
even  though  the  country  has the  ability to refuse  such an offer  and 
store any output  of  good  D for future  sale or consumption.  If, how- 
ever, rescheduling  negotiations  are more  realistically viewed  as bilat- 
eral,  repayments  can  be  less.  Following  Rubinstein  (1982),  we  will 
employ  an alternating  offers  framework  to model  negotiations. 
19 One  reason  8 might  be high  is that the country's leaders  may be uncertain  about 
the  length  of  their  tenure  in office  or,  equivalently  in an unstable  country,  their  life 
expectancy.  For convenience,  we assume  that if they are removed  from office,  the old 
leaders  are replaced  by new leaders  with identical  utility functions. 
20  In a more general  setting in which the country is risk averse, it will want to borrow 
enough  to equate  the ratio of the present  discounted  marginal utilities of consumption 
between  any two periods  with the world interest  rate. If, however,  the country's ability 
to  commit  to  repayments  is  limited,  it  may  have  to  shift  consumption  into  future 
periods  (see,  e.g.,  Sachs  1984).  This  case  is in  most  important  respects  qualitatively 
equivalent.  A significant  difference  is that in the risk-averse case, the country  will take 
time to run up its debt  instead  of  doing  it all at once. SOVEREIGN  DEBT  163 
As a device  for calculating  the equilibrium  of the model,  it is useful 
to proceed  by asking  how much  creditor  banks could  bargain out of 
the country  if it owed  them  an infinite  amount  of debt. This  amount 
will determine  how  much  the country  is initially allowed  to borrow. 
What does  a rescheduling  agreement  look like in the infinite  debt 
case? In a rescheduling  agreement,  the  banks commit  not  to harass 
the  country's  trade  as  long  as  the  country  keeps  current  on  a  re- 
scheduled  payments  stream.  The  banks  can  make  binding  commit- 
ments  by  signing  a  legal  contract.  The  country,  of  course,  cannot 
commit and retains the option  of seeking  a new rescheduling  contract 
at some  future  date.  In return  for agreeing  to new conditions  under 
which they will not harass the country's trade, the banks get a current 
payment and,  possibly, the promise  of higher  future  payments.  Mar- 
ginal debt  is worthless  in the  infinite  debt case, so of course  the cur- 
rent payment  is the  focus  of  the bargaining. 
To  close  the  model,  we  must  still specify  the  exact  nature  of  the 
bargaining  process.  We  will assume  that the  banks and  the  country 
take turns making  offers.  The  length  of time between  offers  is h, the 
same  as the  length  of' time  between  production  periods.2'  An  offer 
made in period  t specifies  the amount  of money  that the country  will 
pay and the amount  of goods  that the country will be allowed to trade 
299  without  the threat of  seizure.  - 
We can exploit  a special feature of' our model to intuit an important 
characteristic of the optimal  rescheduling  contract. Because 8 >  I, it is 
never efficient  to have the country  pay out more than is necessary  to 
clear  the  way  for  trading  its  current  output  and  any  accumulated 
stock. In particular, the country  will never  make a large current  pay- 
ment in exchange  for being  able to trade freely  for, say, five periods 
instead of one.  Up-front  prepayments  are never  part of any equilib- 
rium bargain  because  it is inefficient  to  have  the  high-discount-rate 
country  make  luImp-sum  payments  to  the  low-discount-rate  banks. 
Consequently,  we can  restrict our  attention  to the  case in which  the 
banks and country exchange  offers  over how much the country has to 
pay today  in  exchange  for  being  allowed  to  freely  ship  its current 
21 We will later focus  most  of' our  attention  on  the limiting  case as h -(  0.  Nothing 
important  hinges  on  our  assumption  that the bargaining  interval and  the  production 
interval are the same. 
22  More specifically, we assume  that when it is the country's turn to make an offer,  it 
must first decide  whether  or not to consume  or ship without a rescheduling  agreement. 
If it decides  instead to seek an agreement,  then the country makes an offer.  The  banks 
then  accept  or  reject  this  offer  immediately,  with  trade  occurring  at the  same  time. 
However, if the offer  is rejected, a period passes before a counteroffer  is made. When it 
is the bank's turn to make an offer,  the country  immediately  decides  whether  to accept 
the offer,  consume  or ship without an agreement,  or make a counteroffer.  However,  if 
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stock of goods.  Rescheduling  negotiations  are held constantly.23 Obvi- 
ously,  if  there  were  some  transactions  cost  to  negotiating  in  this 
model,  the optimal  contract would  involve less frequent  negotiations. 
To  rule out supergame  equilibria,  we are going  to assume  that the 
country can produce  good D only until date T, with T arbitrarily large. 
Bargaining  can go on forever.  We will solve for the equilibrium of the 
model  recursively  from  time  T and then  let T --  xo. 
Our notation  for describing  the bargaining  process is as follows.  If 
it is the  banks' turn  to  make  an offer  at time  t, then  they  offer  the 
country  (1  -  qt)P(yh +  St) units of good F, and they offer  themselves 
qtP(yh +  St), 0 '  qt '  1. If it is the country's turn to make an offer  in 
period  t, it offers  itself  (1  -  q')P(yh  +  St) and  offers  the  banks the 
remainder.  When  a rescheduling  agreement  is reached,  the country 
trades and  its revenue  is divided  according  to the agreement. 
We restrict attention  to perfect  equilibria.  Roughly  speaking,  in a 
perfect  equilibrium,  neither  side can influence  the bargaining  by try- 
ing to make a threat (such as "take this offer or I'll walk") that it would 
not carry out  if called  on  to do  so.  Formally,  in every  subgame  of  a 
perfect  equilibrium,  the  strategies  used  by each  of  the  players  must 
constitute  a Nash  equilibrium.  In a perfect  equilibrium,  either  party 
will agree  to a rescheduling  proposal  if the proposal  offers  the party 
at least as much in discounted  present  value as it can expect  to attain 
by waiting,  given  the  strategies  of both  parties. 
At  time  T, there  is  no  future  production,  so  the  two  parties  are 
bargaining  only over the fate of final-period  production,  yh, plus any 
stored amount  of good  D that the country  has entering  period  T, ST. 
In equilibrium  the following  conditions  will have to hold for all t -  T: 
1-  qt=  max  [(1  -q?+/t)  +hi  -  1  (6) 
qt  =  qt+h  1 -  -h  (7) 
Equation  (6)  states  that  for  the  banks' offer  in  period  t  T to  be 
acceptable  to  the  country,  they  must  give  the  country  as much  (in 
discounted  utility terms) as the maximum  of what the country  could 
get if it (a) turned  down  the offer  and made the minimum  acceptable 
counteroffer  in  the  next  period,  (b) consumed  the  output  domes- 
tically, or (c) simply  shipped  the  good  without  a rescheduling  agree- 
ment and suffered  the losses caused by rerouting  or seizure. Equation 
(7) states that if the country  makes an offer,  it must give the banks as 
23 Equivalently,  the  parties can sign  a one-time  rescheduling  agreement  that brings 
the  country's  ftiture  payments  into  line  with  what it would  have  to  pay if it were  to 
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much  (in present  value)  as the banks would  get if they turned  down 
the country's offer  and  made  a minimum  acceptable counteroffer  in 
the next  period. 
Rubinstein  (1982)  showed  that this game has a unique perfect equi- 
librium.24 It is found  by solving  the  system  of  difference  equations 
characterized  by equations  (6) and (7) for the unique stationary state: 
q(h) =  mi-  [  y +  i  (I  +  h  )  '  P  ' 
I 
(8) 
if it is the banks' turn to make an offer  in period  T, and 
q'(h) = m  in  (,y  +  )  )(I 
-  yh) 
(P  -  1)(1  - -yh)  1 -  yh  (9) 
P(1  +  rh)  '  1 + rhJ 
if it is the country's turn to make an offer  in period  T. Note  that the 
parties  always reach  an  agreement  without delay. Bargaining  always 
produces  an efficient  outcome.  Hence  there  will be no trade or debt 
repayments  after period  T.2' Another  key result, due to the risk neu- 
trality assumption,  is that the percentage  shares in any bargain will be 
independent  of the amount  at stake. It is this result, which also holds 
in all periods  prior to T, that provides  the  model  with a stationarity 
that makes it readily solvable. 
Now consider  the  bargaining  problem  in the penultimate  produc- 
tion  period  T  -  h. Both  parties  know  the  equilibrium  in period  T, 
when all remaining  output  will be divided  up according to (8) or (9). It 
is straightforward  to show that when it is the country's turn to offer  in 
T  -  h, its offer  will be exactly equal to q'(h) as given  by equation  (9), 
and if it is the banks' turn, their offer  will be q(h) as given by equation 
(8).  (If  it is the  country's  turn  to  offer  in  T  -  h, the  condition  for 
perfect equilibrium will be the same as expression  [7], except that qT_-h 
replaces q,', and q,?,  is replaced  by q(h) from  eq. [8].) An agreement 
will be  reached  in  T  -  h, and  all  inventory  in  T  -  h,  ST-h,  plus 
production,  yh, will be traded  immediately.  The  consequence  is that 
21  By writing each side's offer  only as a function  of' time, we have implicitly ruled out 
history-dependent  strategies.  However,  as Rubinstein shows, this equilibriulm is unique 
even if history-dependent  strategies are allowed.  For a very simple and elegant proof' of 
Rubinstein's results,  see Shaked  and Sutton  (1984).  For a review of bargaining  theory, 
see  Sutton  (1986).  Note  that  eqq.  (6)  and  (7) constitute  a system  of' two  first-order 
difference  equations,  with  both  roots  outside  the  unit  circle.  Hence  once  we  have 
eliminated  history-dependent  strategies,  the only feasible path is the one that begins at 
the steady state (since q is bounded). 
25  Efficiency is a consequence  of' our  assuLmption  of' f'll  information.  See,  e.g.,  Ad- 
mati  and  Perry  (1987)  f'or a  model  with  asymmetric  information  and  bargaining 
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ST  =  0,  and  in  period  T the  parties  will negotiate  only  over  final 
production  yh. 
Similarly, we can  solve  all periods  prior to T  -  h recursively.  We 
find that in each  period  the output  of that period  is traded,  with the 
banks receiving  q(h)Pyh in  periods  in which  they  make an offer  and 
q'(h)Pyh  in periods in which it is the country's turn to make an offer.26 
In the limit as h ->  0 +  (continuous  bargaining) 
lim  q(h) =  lim  q'(h) =  q =  min  ( >  +  8  I  (  (10) 
Since equation  (10) is substantively  identical to equations  (8) and (9), 
we  will  use  (10)  in  our  discussion  in  the  rest  of  the  paper  partly 
because  it is slightly  simpler  and  partly because  the  limiting  case of' 
continuous  bargaining  seems  the  most realistic. 
Equation  (10)  indicates  that  the  equilibrium  rescheduling  agree- 
ment  will fall into  one  of  three  regions,  depending  on  which of  the 
three right-hand-side  terms in (10) is the minimum.  We call these the 
bargaining  region,  the  autarky-constrained  region,  and  the  punish- 
ment-constrained  region,  respectively.  Note  that  the  three  right- 
hand-side  terms in (10) each depend  on entirely different  parameters 
and are monotonic  in all their arguments.  Therefore,  varying any one 
parameter of the model  will affect only the value of one term and will 
not affect  the relative  ranking  of  the other  two regions. 
In the bargaining  region,  the banks get Py(-y +  8)/(2-y +  8  +  r), and 
the country  gets Py(5y +  r)/(2-y +  8  +  r). An important  feature  here 
is that  the  banks'  receipts  are  linear  in  the  world  market  value  of 
the  country's  production  of  tradables,  not just  the  gains  from  trade 
(P  -  I)y. The  reason  that the banks can effectively  bargain over the 
gross value of tradables, and not just the country's gains from trade, is 
that in the  bargaining  region  the country's  threat  to either  consume 
the goods  or ship them  without  a rescheduling  agreement  is not per- 
fect and therefore  is irrelevant. 
The  relative shares of  the two parties in the bargaining  region  are 
in inverse  proportion  to their rate of impatience  in reaching  a settle- 
ment,  -y +  8 for the country  and -y +  r for the banks. Note  that the 
rate of impatience  for each side is determined  not just by their respec- 
tive rates of  time  preference  but also by the  rate at which  the  good 
deteriorates  in storage,  -y. If -y is large,  as with nondurable  exports, 
26  With risk aversion,  the problem  becomes  much  more complex.  First, the percent- 
age shares at time T are no longer  independent  of S, since (loosely speaking)  the more 
risk-averse  party  will  be  at  a  disadvantage  when  bargaining  over  relatively  large 
amounts  (see  Roth  1985).  Hence  one  complication  is that storage  affects  future  bar- 
gains. Second,  it is no longer  possible to separate the country's consumption-smoothing 
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then the shares in the bargaining  region  are roughly  equal. Note that 
the assumption  of storability  does not prevent us from applying our paradigm 
to a country  that exports  perishable  goods. Think  of the country as holding 
bananas  in  port,  awaiting  a  rescheduling  agreement.  As  long  as  a 
series of  counteroffers  can be exchanged  in the time it takes for the 
bananas to rot, the banks cannot simply make take-it-or-leave-it offers. 
The  higher  the  world  interest  rate,  r,  the  less  a  country  (which 
already owes an infinite  amount)  will have to pay. When world inter- 
est rates rise, the banks become  more impatient  to get their money out 
of' the  country  and  into  high-yielding  investments  elsewhere.  The 
country  can  exploit  this  impatience  to  its  advantage.  27  This  logic 
underlies  our  result in Section  V that an unanticipated  rise in world 
interest  rates  can  actually  favor  the  debtor  country.  In  the  nonsto- 
chastic model of this section,  however,  higher  world interest rates will 
always make the country  worse  off  because  they are perfectly  antici- 
pated. 
When the gains from trade are small (P <  [2y +  8  +  r]/[y +  r]) and 
the potential  costs of  seizure  are relatively high  (1/P  >  1 -  13),  then 
the country's threat to consume  in the absence of a bargaining  agree- 
ment  becomes  credible.  In  this autarky region,  the  payments  to the 
banks prescribed  in the bargaining  region  exceed  the total gains from 
trade.  However,  an  agreement  is always reached  because  the  banks 
will find  it in their interest  to make an offer  allowing  the country  to 
trade  for  a payment  just  infinitesimally  smaller  than  the  total gains 
from  trade.  Within  the  autarky  region,  the  level  of' repayments  is 
extremely  sensitive  to the world market price of the country's output, 
P. Although  in the other  regions  a fall in P affects  the banks and the 
country proportionately  in the autarky-constrained  region  the banks 
bear the whole  loss. 
If 13  is the  minimum  argument  on  the  right-hand  side of  (10), the 
country's threat to trade without  an agreement  is credible.  The  pun- 
ishment-constrained  region  is the  relevant  one  whenever  the  banks 
have very little ability to impose  damage  on the country's trade. Inter- 
estingly,  in the punishment-constrained  region,  the bargaining  equi- 
librium is the same  as the  equilibrium  when  banks can make take-it- 
or-leave-it offers.8  (When one  introduces  uncertainty,  as in the next 
section,  our  bargaining-theoretic  analysis implies  results  very differ- 
ent from those of earlier analyses even if equilibrium  is in the punish- 
ment-constrained  region  in all states of nature.)  The  model  thus pro- 
vides  a  rationalization  for  the  equilibrium  generally  considered  in 
27  Given that 8 >  r if the spread between  the two is a constant,  a rise in both rates still 
hurts the banks' bargaining  position. 
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earlier nonstochastic  models.  In the punishment-constrained  region, 
the banks get P3Py  and the country does  not have any way to negotiate 
a lower payment.  It cannot  credibly commit  to refusing  an offer  that 
gives it infinitesimally  more  than (1  -  P3)Py,  the amount  it would  get 
from shipping  without  a rescheduling  agreement.  The  reason is that 
such  an  offer  is  already  as  good  as  the  country  can  hope  to  get 
through  continued  bargaining. 
Although  the  banks'  ability  to  inflict  damage  on  the  country 
through  seizure sets a ceiling on its repayments,  the ability to increase 
seizures  does  nothing  for  the  banks  outside  of  the  punishment- 
constrained  region.  An increase  in 13  has no effect  on debt payments 
in the bargaining  region.  It also would not help the banks to be able to 
reduce  the  deadweight  loss  involved  in  the  seizure  technology.  As 
long as the banks get any positive  net revenues  from  seizure,  that is, 
(x >  0,  it is completely  credible  for  the  banks  to  threaten  maximal 
seizure  activities  if  the  country  tries  to  ship  without  a rescheduling 
agreement.  On the other  hand,  if the equilibrium  is in the bargaining 
region,  it does  not matter if uxPy  >  Py(-y +  8)/(2-y +  8  +  r), in which 
case  banks  obtain  less  through  bargaining  than  they  would  if  the 
country  traded  without  a  rescheduling  agreement.  The  banks' 
difficulty is that they cannot initiate seizures until the country initiates 
trade; this is why the size of  at  does  not  matter.29) 
The  maximum  amount  the  country  can  borrow  is calculated  by 
taking the present  value of the maximum  repayments  it would  make 
if  it had  a (nominally)  infinite  liability. Such  a loan  would  give  the 
banks  annual  payments  equal  to  what  is  prescribed  by  (10),  dis- 
counted  by the interest  rate r: 
,  Pq  (11) 
r 
The  market value of the country's debt can never exceed  the amount 
given  by (11).  Once  the  country  has borrowed  Pyqlr, marginal  debt is 
worthless.  Note  that a higher  value of r can reduce  the maximum  loan 
in two ways. First, a higher  discount  rate makes the present  value of 
any given  stream of  repayments  less valuable to the bank. Second,  if 
equilibrium  is in the  bargaining  region,  an increase  in the  discount 
rate of the banks makes them worse bargainers and thus decreases  the 
level  of  repayments  in  every  period.  Since  we  have  assumed  that 
banks are competitive  and earn zero profits on their initial loans, both 
29  If, a  <  0, then  the banks' threat to seize shipments  is not credible and they will not 
be paid a peso in a perfect  equilibrium.  See, however,  n.  16. It seems quite plausible to 
assume  (x >  0  at some  level  of' seizure  activity  whenever  the  country  trades  at the 
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factors will necessarily  imply a loss of  utility to the country's leaders. 
Of  course,  we  have  been  assuming  that  the  country's  output  is not 
growing.  If its output  grows at rate g, then  t =  Pyql(r -g).3()  If the 
country's growth rate exceeds  the relevant interest rate, it can borrow 
as much  as it wants. 
V.  Stochastic  Output  and  Interest  Rates 
With uncertainty,  the maximum  amount  the country can be forced to 
pay fluctuates.  Here we derive the optimal incentive-compatible  lend- 
ing contract  for  the  stochastic  case and  examine  some  of  its proper- 
ties.  Of' course,  even  when  payments  fluctuate,  there  may never  be 
any need to recontract  formally.  But in general,  this is true only if the 
explicit legal contract  is fully state contingent  and never  calls for the 
country to make payments  higher  than those it could get by initiating 
rescheduling  negotiations. 
The  maximum  amount  the  country  can  initially  borrow,  Wt,  de- 
pends  on  the probability distribution  of the maximum  payments  the 
country will pay. It is simplest to begin with the case in which output is 
stochastic since  the country's  payments  are linear in output.  Assume 
that output  each  period  is independently  and  identically  distributed 
on the interval  [yIII1II,  yIllX],  according  to the  density  function  f (y).  Then 
the country's borrowing  limit is given  by 
= qP  {  e-'  {  yf(y)dyds  (12) 
or, equivalently, 
9  qPE(y)  (3  q  r '  ~~~~~~(13)  q  r 
where E(y) is the expected  level of output.  Generalization  of' (12) and 
(13)  to  allow  for  intertemporal  correlation  in  output  levels  is 
straightforward.  Because  6  >  r,  the  country  will clearly  borrow  Jt 
immediately  in return  for  incurring  obligations  that will lead  to the 
same stream of  repayments  as infinite  debt. 
Stochastic  interest  rates  present  slightly  more  technical  problems 
since our  analysis of  bargaining  imposed  constant  interest  rates. Al- 
though  it is feasible  to extend  the  model  to allow for  fairly general 
stochastic processes  for  interest  rates, we shall analyze only  a special 
30  One  possible  extension  of  the  model  would  be to introduce  investment  along  the 
lines of  Sachs (1984)  and  Cohen  and  Sachs (1986).  If the  country  can precommit  to 
invest some  part of  its share of  the gains  from  trade, creditor  banks will accept lower 
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simple case, one  that nevertheless  allows us to bring out some  impor- 
tant points. 
We shall assume  that there will be a one-time  permanent  change  in 
the  world  interest  rate,  occurring  at  some  random  time  t with  the 
density function  XeX-  At for 0 <  X, 0 ?  t c  x. When the shock occurs, the 
postshock interest rate will be f, where f is distributed  with probability 
density g(i) along the positive interval [r"' , rII'dx], r"Illx <  6. In this case, 
the collateral the country  has to offer  can be thought  of as the sum of 
two claims, one of which pays qP5 in all periods after the shock (where 
the  banks' share  q is a function  of  the  realization  of  f)  and  one  of 
which pays a fixed  amount  q+Py  in all periods  prior to the shock. 
The  value of the claim that requires payments only in the postshock 
period  is 
Y  =  Py  e  A  +t-)tE  )dt  =  PyXE(qy/i)  (14) 
That  is, after  the  shock  the banks get  a perpetuity  with payments  at 
rate  qPy,  discounted  forever  at rate f.  The  likelihood  that  the  per- 
petuity will begin in year t is XeXA,  and the present discounted  value of 
a dollar in year t is e  -t.  Similarly, the value of the loan on which 
payments  are received  only before  the shock is 
n  =  PyJ  e-- (  +r)tqmdt=  (15) 
The  maximum  amount  the country  can borrow, Ok,  is found  by sum- 
ming Y  +  Q 31 
The anticipation  of high future  interest rates is bad for the country, 
just as in the nonstochastic  case. If the cumulative  density function  of 
interest  rates  is stochastically  decreased,  so  that the  probability  that 
rates will be below any given level r* is reduced,  then the country will 
be  able  to  borrow  less.  First,  future  repayments  will be  discounted 
more heavily. Second,  banks anticipate that the country will be a more 
effective  bargainer  when  their  opportunity  cost  of  outside  invest- 
ments  is high.  However,  although  anticipated interest  rate  increases 
are bad  for  the  country,  it may benefit  by unanticipated  interest  rate 
increases.  It is a simple  matter  to show  that this is the case once  the 
country  is "loaned  up," that is, when  the  country  has already  com- 
31 In general qy does not equal q, the level of payments the country could be forced to 
make  if  no  shock  were  ever  anticipated,  because  the  bargaining  over  each  unit  is 
affected  by the  possibility  that  the  banks' opportunity  cost of' waiting  may change  at 
some point.  However,  our bargaining  model  can still be solved when uncertainty about 
interest  rates follows  a Poisson  process,  and  it is a simple  matter to derive  qy  =  [8  + 
2XE(q)]/(8 +  2A +  r) (as h -O  +0).  Hence  if E(Q)  =  q, then  payments  in the preshock 
period  will be q. SOVEREIGN  DEBT  171 
mitted  to  a stream  of  repayments  greater  than  it can  be  forced  to 
repay  in any  state  of  nature.  In  this  case,  an  unanticipated  interest 
rate increase will then either reduce or leave unchanged  the payments 
the country  can be forced  to make. 
An  unanticipated  rise  in  world  interest  rates  can  benefit  even  a 
debtor with floating rate debt indexed  to the world interest rate. Thus 
the fact that there  are more  LDC defaults  when  world interest  rates 
rise  need  not  be  explained  solely  by  debtor  countries'  inability  to 
handle  the excess debt burden.  It can also be due  to the way in which 
high world interest  rates improve  a debtor's bargaining  position.  Pay- 
ments  can  actually  go  down.  One  can  easily  extend  the  analysis  to 
show that this "bargaining effect" depends  on real interest rates and is 
not a function  of  the  inflation  rate. 
Finally,  we  consider  the  optimal  form  of  sovereign  lending  con- 
tracts. The  issue is how to make best use of the country's only vehicle 
for  legal  precommitment,  the  creditor  country  courts.  We will con- 
tinue  to  assume  that  the  country's  discount  rate is higher  than  the 
world interest  rate in all states so that the country  would  like to bor- 
row the maximum  possible  amount.  The  optimal  legal contract gives 
the banks enough  bargaining  power to assure that they will be able to 
collect the maximum  possible amount  in all states of nature. Whereas 
such  a contract  implicitly  gives  the  banks a contingent  claim on  the 
country's  production,  there  are  at  least  two  closely  related  reasons 
(within the  scope  of  the  model)  why it will be in the  interests  of  the 
parties to formally label the country's obligation  "debt." First, suppose 
instead that the banks are given  equity in the country's export  indus- 
tries. Then  if the country  later adopts  a policy interfering  with repa- 
triation of dividends  or if it taxes exports,  the banks' share is reduced 
and they do not have the same legal recourse  given to them by a loan 
default.  Second,  and perhaps  more relevant to uncertainty  about pro- 
duction,  the variables that determine  repayments  may be observable 
but  not  verifiable.  That  is,  although  both  parties  may  have  equal 
knowledge  about  developments  in the country's  productive  capacity, 
it may be difficult  to accumulate  evidence  that will stand up in cred- 
itor  country  courts.  Most  debtor  countries  do  not  publish  national 
GNP accounts,  and even  if they did, these could be distorted  in a way 
that would be difficult  to document.  Therefore,  it may be impossible 
to write enforceable  contracts that are explicitly contingent  on the key 
repayment  variables,  and  there  may  sometimes  be  a  need  to  write 
rescheduling  agreements. 
We can see, then,  why the optimal  legal contract might set the face 
value of  the debt  so high  that the country  will partially default  in all 
but the most favorable  states of nature.  Note  that it is irrelevant  how 
the discrepancy  between  the  market  value  and  the  face value of  the 1 72  JOURNAL  OF  POLITICAL  ECONOMY 
original loan is created.  Debt can be sold at an original issue discount, 
or the banks can impose  large service fees on the country,  so that the 
amount  of  money  given  the  country  is less than the  face amount  of 
the loan. 
The  explicit  contract  between  the banks and the country  may also 
deviate  from  the  implicit  contract  because  it is not  possible  to write 
side payments  from  creditor  country  taxpayers  into  the contract,  an 
issue  we  consider  next.  It  may  be  necessary  to  have  rescheduling 
negotiations  in order  to get  creditor  country  taxpayers  to cough  up 
their "share." 
VI.  Creditor  Country  Government  Participation 
Implicit in our earlier analysis is the assumption  that creditor country 
governments  can commit to not making side payments to "facilitate" a 
rescheduling  agreement.  Unfortunately  for  them,  if such a commit- 
ment  is not possible,  the banks and the debtors  may be able to force 
third-party  (creditor  country  taxpayer)  side payments. 
The  problem  is that the LDCs would  not be the only losers if trade 
were  made  more  expensive.  Their  trading  partners  would  lose  too, 
especially if several debtors defaulted  simultaneously.32 Still, from our 
earlier analysis, it might  seem  that there  is no way for banks and the 
debtor  countries  to  exploit  the  vested  interests  of  "innocent"  third 
parties. After all, our model  predicts that in bilateral negotiations  the 
banks  and  the  country  will come  to  a  rescheduling  agreement  im- 
mediately,  with no loss of trading  benefits  for anyone.  However,  one 
can  show  that  if  the  gains  from  trade  with  LDCs  are  important 
enough  to creditor country governments,  the banks and the LDCs can 
game other  creditor  country  citizens into making side payments.3  If 
these  side  payments  are anticipated,  they  may increase  the  amounts 
that banks will lend  to  the  LDCs in the  first place.  Note  that if  the 
country  faces  competitive  lenders,  then  all the  benefits  of  perfectly 
anticipated  taxpayer  side  payments  accrue  to  the  borrower.  These 
side payments  can take many forms,  ranging  from increased  funding 
for  multilateral  lending  agencies  to  tax  breaks on  bank  income  for 
LDC loans. Of course,  investors' expectations  about creditor  country 
Fear of' a banking  crisis, or  at least large  payments  by federal  deposit  insurance 
agencies,  is also cited by some analysts as a reason why the industrialized  countries  have 
a  vested  interest  in  successful  negotiations.  Such  concerns  give  debtors  and  banks 
bargaining  leverage  with creditor  country  governments. 
3  See, e.g., Euromoiiey  (March  1986, p. 50): "Unfortunately  for Uncle  Sam, the com- 
mercial banks are well aware that Mexico is too vital to U.S. interests to let go, so will be 
tempted  to be even  tougher  than  usual in the expectation  that what they do  not pro- 
vide,  the  American  taxpayer  in some  form  will." Details of' our  technical  analysis are 
presented  in an earlier  version  of' this paper  (Bulow  and  Rogoff  1986). SOVEREIGN  DEBT  173 
side payments  are incorporated  in the secondary  market prices cited 
in note  2. 
VII.  Conclusion 
In our  dynamic  bargaining  model  of  sovereign  debt,  all the  players 
are  completely  rational  and  fully  anticipate  the  possibility  of  re- 
schedulings.  However,  many observers now think that the banks were 
crazy to  lend  LDCs  so  much  money  in  the  1970s,  at least  without 
charging  vastly higher  risk premia.  Which view is correct? It seems to 
us that an important  part of what happened  was just bad luck. During 
the  early  1980s  the  terms  of  trade  turned  sharply  against  many, 
though  not  all,  LDCs.34 Real  interest  rates  rose  to  levels  far  above 
those  that  prevailed  during  most  of  the  sixties  and  seventies.  Our 
bargaining  analysis  predicts  that  an  unanticipated  interest  rate  rise 
has two negative  effects on the market value of LDC debt. Not only do 
higher  interest  rates reduce  the present  value of any given stream of 
debt  repayments,  but they  also hurt the bargaining  position  of bank 
creditors.  In rescheduling  negotiations,  "loaned-up" LDC debtors can 
exploit  banks' impatience  to get out their money  and place it in high- 
yielding  investments  elsewhere.  Finally, our analysis suggests  the pos- 
sibility that banks may have rationally anticipated  their ability to bar- 
gain side  payments  out of creditor  country  taxpayers. 
The  Rubinstein-type  model  developed  here  does  not  endogenize 
every element  of the bargaining  process. The  exogenous  elements  are 
summarized  in  the  alternating  offers  framework.  (A  party  would 
benefit if it got to make more than half of the offers,  e.g.) The  model 
does  successfully  endogenize  some  aspects of bargaining,  such as the 
effect  of relative discount  rates and threat points.  Taking  account  of 
the basic principles  of bargaining  theory has also made our treatment 
of  the  effect  of  uncertainty  on  implicit  LDC  debt  contracts  more 
realistic. 
Finally, we note two avenues  for future  research.  Relaxing our risk 
neutrality  assumption  would  allow one  to consider  future  consump- 
tion-smoothing  loans  as a motivation  for  making  debt  repayments. 
Perhaps  more  significantly,  the  full-information  specification  of  our 
model  implies  that  no  outright  repudiations  or delays  in renegotia- 
tions  will occur.  Adding  informational  asymmetries,  while  perhaps 
requiring  some  simplifications,  should  provide  a  richer  framework 
for examining  suspensions  of  repayments  and other  breakdowns. 
31 For example,  from  1979 to  1982,  Brazil's average  export  dollar prices fell by 5.9 
percent  while  import  dollar  prices  rose  by  36.7  percent  (see  Diaz-Alejandro  1983, 
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Appendix 
The  Efficacy  of Legal  Sanctions35 
A crucial assumption  of our paper is that industrialized  country creditors can 
impose costs on deadbeat  LDC debtors  that are significant relative to current 
debt  levels.  Here  we  argue  that  this assumption  is entirely  plausible.  Real- 
world  sovereign  debt  contracts  do  provide  creditors  with  binding  and  en- 
forceable contractual  rights, that is, rights that will stand up in creditor coun- 
try courts.  Moreover,  the limited  evidence  suggests  that these  rights do help 
banks interfere  with the international  goods  market and capital market trans- 
actions of any repudiating  debtor. 
Since World War II, the rights of creditors  have been  strengthened  as the 
major creditor  countries  have  changed  their  policies  on  foreign  sovereign 
immunity.  "Nearly  all  non-Communist  states  now  adhere  to  the  restrictive 
theory,  which distinguishes  between  'governmental  activities' (de  jure imperil) 
and activities of  the  kind  that may also be carried  on  by private persons  (de 
jure  gestionis)"  (American  Law Institute  1981,  pp.  177-78),  such as commer- 
cial activities. In the  United  States, the policy of restricted  foreign  sovereign 
immunity  was formally  adopted  with the Tate  letter in  1952 and codified  in 
the Foreign  Sovereign  Immunities  Act (FSIA) of  1976. In Great Britain, the 
State Immunity  Act of  1978 accomplished  the  same thing. 
These  legal  changes  essentially  make  it easier  for  prospective  sovereign 
debtors  to court  creditors  by strengthening  creditors'  rights  in default.3" A 
key feature  of the FSIA is that it permits countries  to waive sovereign  immu- 
nity in many  commercial  transactions.  In  the  last  10 years,  most  LDC debt 
contracts  have  contained  explicit  waivers  of  sovereign  immunity,  with  the 
details of the waiver a significant  bargaining  point  (see, e.g.,  Gurria-Trevino 
1983; Nurick  1983; Soliven  1983; Bradlow and Jourdin  1984). Consequently, 
countries  that now  try to repudiate  their  debts  find  it extremely  difficult  to 
obtain letters of credit and are forced  to conduct  roundabout,  secret transac- 
tions even  to pay cash in advance  (see Alexander  1987,  p. 42). 
Examples  in recent  years in which  creditors  have been  able to effectively 
enforce  their legal rights include  Kennecott  Copper's response  to its Chilean 
nationalization.37  Kennecott's  strategy  was so successful  that even  though  it 
had sold a 51 percent  interest  in its Chilean operations  to the government  in 
1965, in  1971 it received  compensation  that was greater  than the book value 
of the operations  prior  to the  sale (Moran  1973,  p. 284).  Also,  the threat of 
attaching  oil exports  was sufficient  to extract substantial compensation  from 
Algeria,  Iraq, and Libya for their nationalization  of Western oil companies  in 
the  1970s (p. 286). 
The  key point here is the following.  Suppose  that Brazil repudiates  its debts 
to Citicorp.  If Citicorp's detectives  can track down  any bank accounts  Brazil 
holds  in the United  States, or even  any computers  purchased  by Brazil that 
have  not  yet  been  shipped,  it can  attach  the  assets,  arguing  that  they  are 
We thank  Tom  Campbell  of  Stanford  Law School  and  Harold  Koh of' Yale Law 
School for helpful  discussions.  Of course,  all the opinions  and any errors in this mate- 
rial are the  sole  responsibility  of  the authors. 
36  For more  details  see Wood  (1980)  and  Delaume  (1984). 
37  Kennecott  was able to attach the actual bars of copper  exported  by Chile after the 
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Brazilian  property  and  are  subject  to  foreclosure.  Because  Brazil  owes 
significant amounts  to banks in all the major industrialized  countries,  it would 
not have an easier  time  elsewhere.  Indeed,  it is no  accident  that syndicated 
bank  loans  generally  involve  banks  from  all  the  borrower's  major  trading 
partners  and  that the  loans  contain  equal-sharing  and  cross-default  clauses. 
Brazil also  cannot  costlessly  evade  seizure  simply  by creating  dummy  "pri- 
vate" corporations  through  which  to conduct  its international  transactions. 
Creditors  may be able to overcome  this ploy if they are able to demonstrate 
that the dummy  corporation  is merely  a veil that is being  used to circumvent 
their rights.)8 It is very important  to note that regardless of whether efforts  to 
attach  Brazil's  assets  eventually  hold  up  in  court,  they  present  a  credible 
threat.  Creditors  know  that,  because  of  their  suits' nuisance  value,  it will be 
worthwhile  for  Brazil to offer  a settlement,  as in the oil and copper  cases. 
Estimates  of  the  costs  of  sanctions  are  few  and  necessarily  imprecise.39 
However,  we do  know  that for  many  developing  countries,  most of  foreign 
trade  is with  their  industrialized  creditors.  In  the  case of  Mexico,  industri- 
alized  countries  account  for  about  90  percent  of  imports  and  exports.  For 
Brazil, the comparable  figures  are 60 percent  of imports and a slightly higher 
fraction of exports,  despite  Brazil's heavy reliance on imported  oil (see Inter- 
national  Monetary  Fund  1987).  In  1984,  the  gross  domestic  products  of 
Argentina,  Brazil, and Mexico totaled $433  billion. Trade  disruptions  costing 
less than  3 percent  of  GDP,  or 9  percent  of  the  total value  of  imports  and 
exports,  would  be  more  costly  than  making  payments  of  5 percent  of  total 
external  debt  (see  World  Bank  1986;  International  Monetary  Fund  1987). 
Such payments,  made  consistently,  would  make commercial  bank loans look 
very solid.  Sanctions  of  half  this magnitude  could  fully support  the current 
market  value  of  these  loans,  even  ignoring  the  value  to  creditors  of  any 
subsidies they might expect  to receive  from  their home  countries.  Of course, 
as we emphasize  in the text,  the ability of banks to inflict a given  amount  of 
damage  does  not  imply  that  they  can  extract  payments  of  the  same  mag- 
nitude.  Nevertheless,  trade  sanctions  can plausibly explain  the actual repay- 
ments that do  occur. 
Certainly the statements  of a number of prominent  debtor country leaders, 
such  as Jesus  Silva  Herzog40)  and  Corazon  Aquino,4'  have  indicated  their 
3  In the United  States, the ability of'claimants  to pierce the corporate  veil, called the 
Deep Rock doctrine,  was enunciated  in Taylor  v. Standard  Gas & Electric Co., 306  U.S. 
30(7 (1939)  (see  Krotinger  1942). 
$  Hufbauer  and  Schott  (1985,  p. 414)  estimated  the  cost  to Rhodesia  of' the  trade 
sanctions  imposed  against it, gross of' some  gain from debt repudiation,  to be just over 
15 percent  of' GNP  per  annum.  Their  back-of'-the-envelope  estimates  for other  cases 
involving  sanctions  were  significantly  smaller,  but  in  the  vast  majority  of' cases  the 
sender  of' the sanction  was only  attempting  to curtail a small fraction of' the  receiver's 
trade.  Nevertheless,  they  argue  that  these  sanctions  have  often  been  successful.  A 
recent case in which sanctions  have had an immediate  and powerful  impact involves the 
United  States against  Panama in March  1988. 
4" "We asked ourselves  the question  what happens  if' we say 'No dice.  We just  won't 
pay.' There  are some  partisans to that. But it didn't make any sense.  We're part of' the 
world. We import thirty percent  of' our food.  We can'tjust  say 'Go to Hell' " (Jesus Silva 
Herzog,  then  Mexican  Finance  Minister, quoted  in Kraft [1984,  p. 4]). 
4  "Under  the  continued  threat  of' a cut-off  in trade  credits  which  would  give  new 
vigor to the enemies  of' democracy,  and give them a signal to seize the moment,  we had 
to  relent  and  sign  an  agreement"  (Corazon  Aquino,  quoted  in  the  July  28,  1987, 
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belief that banks' ability to threaten  a country's trade is an important  factor in 
debt  rescheduling  negotiations.  Reports  of  the  consequences  of  the  Bra- 
zilian debt  moratorium  of  1987-88  and  the  reasons  Brazil returned  to the 
bargaining  table reinforce  the  view that trade penalties  are important.42 
Finally, our  analysis  is broadly  consistent  with evidence  from  the  thirties, 
when  the  last great  wave  of  sovereign  debt  reschedulings  occurred.43 The 
defaults  occurred  at  a  time  when  LDCs' gains  from  trade  had just  plum- 
meted.  The  infamous  Smoot-Hawley  tariff  act was signed  into  U.S.  law in 
June  of  1930,  and  many  other  countries  then  raised  their  tariff  barriers as 
well.  The  LDC debt  market  dried  up  shortly  thereafter,  and  beginning  in 
early 1931, a large number  of LDCs, beginning  with Bolivia (see Sachs 1984), 
fell into arrears on their foreign  bonds.  4 However,  in almost all cases, debt- 
ors ultimately entered  into rescheduling  agreements  with bondholders'  com- 
mittees,  and eventually  the two sides arrived at settlements  involving  at least 
partial repayments  (see  Folkerts-Landau  1985). 
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